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APPELLANTfS REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant alleges that the law dq>es not require one to 
do a useless or impossible thing andl it is clear from the 
testimony that all of the personal property which was 
secured by the agreement was disposed of by the primary 
obligor, Carrier Brokers prior to the institution of this 
action. (TR Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law p. 131 
Paragraph 9) . During the period of time the appellant was 
attempting to foreclose upon the Second trust deed, a 
stipulation was entered staying said [foreclosure and during 
said period of time Valley Bank & Trust under the first deed 
of trust foreclosed upon the real property in question and 
took possession of said real 
property pursuant to the foreclosure. (TR Stipulation and 
Agreement p. 32 through 33). 
It is clear that the additional agreement executed by 
the Defendant, J.M. Stoof, does not act as a novation and is 
not intended as a substitution of the original debt or 
agreement by the guarantors. The above issues were not 
raised in the Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A PARTY DOES NOT HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO DO A USELESS OR 
IMPOSSIBLE ACT. 
It is clear from the trial of the issues and the 
testimony taken that the personal property was disposed of 
by the primary obligor/ with the proceeds being received by 
the primary obligor, and that the real property was 
foreclosed upon by a First Deed of Trust and therefore not 
available to the plaintiff. (TR Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law p. 131 paragraph 9) (TR Stipulation and 
Agreement p. 32 through 33). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Ledger Construction/ Inc. vs. 
Roberts, Inc. (1976) 550 P 2d 212 held that the law does not 
require one to do a useless or impossible thing and it is 
clear from the facts as established in this case that the 
property was not available for satisfaction of the Primary 
Obligor's or the Guarantor's indebtedness. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Continental Bank & Trust 
Company vs. Utah Mortgage, Inc. (1985)1 11 UAR 38 held that 
guarantors are able to contract for the release of security 
held for the payment of a debt and paragraph 4 and 5 of the 
July 20th 1981 agreement provides for a waiver. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Strevell Patterson Company, 
Inc. vs. Francis (1982) 646 P 2d 741 in deciding whether a 
creditor must exhaust its remedies against the debtor and 
the secured party before commencing an action directly 
against the guarantor held that in an absolute guarantee the 
fact that a creditor did not exhaust 
the debtor or the security does not alter the nature of the 
his remedies against 
a guarantor. In the 
Agreement between the 
guarantors independent obligation as 
present action it is clear that the 
parties is an absolute guarantee ar|d that the security 
outlined under the agreement was n|ot available to the 
appellant. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Simpsbn vs. General Motors 
Corporation (1970) 470 P 2d 399 held that: 
'Orderly procedure, whose proper 
settlement of controversies, requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his 
recovery to the trial court; arid having done sof he 
cannot thereafter change to somq 
thus attempt to keep in motion 
litigation." 
purpose is the final 
theory or theories of 
different theory and 
the merry-go-round of 
The issue of creditor having exhausted its remedies was not 
brought before the Trial Court. (TR| 
Conclusions of Law p. 131) 
Finding of Fact and 
POINT TWO 
THE NOTATION ON THE AGREEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT J. M. 
STOOF DOES NOT AMOUNT TO A NOVATION. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Taylor vs. Paulson (1976) 552 
P 2d 1274 at page 1275 held: 
MA creditor's mere acceptance of the obligation of a 
third person without an agreement or intention to 
release the original debtor or extinguish the original 
debt does not amount to a novation." 
"...The burden of proof as to a novation by the 
transaction in question rests upon the party who 
asserts it; that an intention to effect a novation will 
not be presumed; that, in the absense of evidence 
indicating a contrary intention, it will be presumed, 
prima facie, that the new obligation was accepted 
merely as an additional or collateral security or 
conditionally, subject to the payment thereof; and that 
the intention to effect a novation must be clearly 
shown." 
It is clear from the notation placed upon the original 
contract that the joint obligor evidenced the indebtedness 
in question and the short term nature of the indebtedness 
and was not intended as a novation or a substitution. 
Respondent did not argue a theory of novation at the 
trial level and is precluded from arguing novation on 
appeal. Simpson vs. General Motors Corporation (1970) 470 P 
2d 399. 
CONCLUSION 
The property under the agreement of July 20
 f 1981 was 
not available for Third Party Plaintiff Defendant/Appellant, 
Spanish Trail, said property was sold by the primary obligor 
or foreclosed by the first trust deed. The notation on the 
agreement of July 20, 1981 is clearly 
an acknowledgement of the the original 
For the foregoing reasons Appellant respectively 
|not a novation but is 
indebtedness. 
as to C.A. Bailey be 
against the guarantor 
requests that the lower courts ruling 
reversed and that Judgment be entered 
C.A. Bailey pursuant to the terms ofj the agreement dated 
July 20, 1981. 
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